The Normative Power of a Normal State: Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germany's Post-Wall Foreign Policy

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Introduction

Germany's growing weight on the world stage is indisputable, and its foreign policy stance is exceptional among powerful states. Remarkably, as German power has grown, the vision guiding policy has not returned to assumptions of international anarchy and the use of traditional power politics that bolster short-term self interest. Instead, that vision emphasizes multilateralism, integration, diplomacy, and anti-militarism. It is a vision that accepts the necessity of cooperation in pursuit of its international goals, sees military means to secure its interests abroad as a last resort, and submits to the governance of international institutions in the regulation of its international affairs. Unlike the policies of Britain, France, or the United States, German foreign policy represents a radical departure from the traditional aims and goals of power politics. As Regina Karp writes: "This vision (Weltanschauung) rests on deeply held assumptions about the possibilities and opportunities for progress in international relations; the mechanisms by which peace and stability can be achieved and sustained; the civilizational potential of treaties, rules, and norms; and the inevitable decline of the state as the single most important locus of political organization."[2]

For most international relations theorists and foreign policy observers, this is either the vision of a weak state or a paradigm shift in the international aims of a powerful one. For Germany, it began as the former and has now become the latter. Devised as a pragmatic international strategy for a defeated state, this *Weltanschauung* has become a sincere commitment that has been stamped deeply into the decision-making system of every German foreign ministry since the founding of the Federal Republic.

Not only has this vision curiously endured as German power has grown, it has become a fitting paradigm for international behavior in the 21st century. Post-war German foreign policy was forced to renounce many sovereignty claims, but at the moment sovereignty was regained, its usefulness in international relations was called into question. The post-war Federal Republic was yoked to Western Europe by the victors of war, but at the moment when Germany could have loosened that yoke, the European Union—and Germany's role in it—grew in strength. The post-war Federal Republic renounced militarism, but at the moment when a growing German military power became acceptable, international problems increasingly defied military solutions. Formulated for pragmatic reasons in an earlier era, the vision is again pragmatic for different reasons in the twenty-first century. Now, a great-power policy that was once considered "idealistic" has now become "realistic."

This essay explores the meaning of Germany's strange twenty-year marriage between traditional state power and a foreign policy vision which transforms the meaning

of that power. I begin with a brief discussion of the intellectual debates over continuity and change in German foreign policy since unification. I place my own view within the context of those debates and argue that German practices have historically adhered to that vision *and* deviated from it, both before and after unification. I argue that it is not the policy that changed after October 3, 1990, but it is the *discourse* about that policy that changed. German power began to grow before that date and continued afterwards, and power turned a pragmatic vision into a radical one. Looking at the current manifestation of power and vision in Germany's foreign policy, I claim that, paradoxically, what may seem radical is now the most pragmatic. Although practice and vision do not always coincide, Germany's vision is ideally suited to steer policy in a world where rigid notions of power, sovereignty, and the "national interest" are everywhere in evidence but nowhere succeeding as guides to foreign policy.

Beyond Continuity and Change

During the "Bonn Republic," German foreign policy practices were seen as largely consistent with the *Weltanschauing* of a weak, divided, and occupied state. But with Germany's rise to power and achievement of sovereignty, the question of consistency between practice and vision became a matter of intense academic debate.[3] Does continued alignment with its vision characterize Germany's post-unification international practices? Or has German foreign policy "changed" to reflect a more narrow self-interested behavior that rising power would confer, both inside and out of multilateral institutions? Do decision-makers' references to Germany as a "great power," signal this change? Have we seen the weakening of anti-militarism as German power has grown? Behind the divergent answers to these questions stands a larger debate about theories of international relations and whether those theories can guide foreign policy analysis.[4]

The "realist" view

Proponents of the "change" thesis usually adhere to realist theories of international relations and believe that foreign policy is guided by a state's power position and its "national interest" in maintaining power in an anarchic world. Some speculate that, as its power has increased, Germany is indeed returning (or should return) to the practices of traditional power politics.[5] For realists, Germany's foreign policy practices were expected to conform to its new power position, and each policy decision was interpreted as an exercise of the kind self-interested behavior that power permits. Realist sentiments were particularly prominent in the media. For example, some cited the unilateral recognition of Croatia as an instance of a more powerful Germany recreating its World War II alliance with an independent Croatia as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy in order to assert power in the Balkans.[6] The Bundesbank's startling interest rate hike in 1992 that briefly derailed the progress toward monetary union was cited as an example of Germany's effort to undermine the project of European integration: Germany was said to be flexing its 'deal-breaking' muscle, by raising interest rates at precisely the time when the French government faced a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Germany's breach of the Eurozone's 'Stability and Growth Pact' accompanying EMU was interpreted as evidence of a weakened "European identity" and an assertion of national self-interest. The American media criticized Gerhard Schroeder's refusal to participate in the invasion of Iraq as a break 'with the caution of postwar [German] policy' and urged that 'the focus in

Berlin ought not to be on Germany's "great power".' Many analysts interpreted the growth of Germany's military participation in the wars of the Yugoslav succession and in Afghanistan as a sign that Germany's unique vision had expired.[7] And some argued that Germany's refusal to "bail out" its weaker neighbors to the East in the 2008-09 financial crisis represented blatant self-interest.

The Constructivist View

On the other side stand the "constructivists" who believe that power politics in international relations can be transcended. Pointing to Germany's deepened participation in the process of European integration, they argue that, incidents of deviation notwithstanding, united Germany has clearly engaged in practices that are, for the most part, consistent with the continuity of the Bonn Republic's normative vision.[8] And although Germany's military force has grown, it is largely limited to missions of peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian aid. The refusal to participate in the Iraq invasion is seen as a political tactic that appealed to the German populace and therefore as a testament to Germany's commitment to anti-militarism.

At its heart, these differing interpretations and choice of emphasis are more about the viability of competing theories of international relations than about German foreign policy itself. Each side musters pieces of evidence to support its position, and opposing interpretations of similar evidence have kept the debate alive: Does the bid for a seat on the UN Security Council suggest an even greater commitment to multilateralism or does it show that Germany seeks recognition of its powerful *national* position in international politics and the symbolic status of a great power? Was Germany's refusal to participate in America's Iraq war in 2002/03 evidence of a break with multilateralism or of a fundamental commitment to anti-militarism? Does any *one* breach of a multilateral agreement signal a fundamental break with multilateralism itself? Is the essential German policy vision still alive but simply *adapting* to changing circumstances?

A mighty vision: Regional Hegemony and Normative Power

My thesis does not fit particularly well on either side. It claims that Germany has changed the way it has pursued its original vision as its power position in Europe and in international politics has grown. More importantly, it emphasizes the importance of the vision as a practical guide to the policy of powerful states as the 21st century advances. In emphasizing the importance of the original vision, I suggest that 1990 does not represent a significant break: *continuity* characterizes both vision and practice. The vision remains, but practices since 1949 have both *conformed to* the vision and *deviated from* it. The assertion of self-interest is not unique to the post-wall period; Germany often exhibited moments of self-interested behavior both early in the life of the Federal Republic and later, as its power grew. Practices that either conform to or deviate from the vision are not easily correlated with the rise in power and achievement of sovereignty.

C*hange* is crucial to my argument in three respects. First, at the analytic level, *interpretations* of the significance of practices that deviated from the vision have changed. Before unification, most observers either ignored or tolerated deviations. Flexing muscles as power grew was not seen as a return to power politics. After unification, however, each deviation was magnified and exaggerated as a significant departure from the unique vision of cooperation and antimilitarism. The interpretations

changed because Germany's power had grown and expectations of behavior were grounded in traditional paradigms of international relations and foreign policy behavior and in Germany's "new" international power position.

Second, my own interpretation is that power has changed things, but in a different way than most analysts suggest. As German power has grown, the impact of practices based on the original vision has changed. In this argument, I have dusted off the old tenets of "hegemonic stability theory."[9] I argue that Germany has become a "regional hegemon" in Europe and one of the "great powers" on the international stage. Germany *has* asserted its power, but, for the most part, *the assertion of power has been on behalf of the vision.* Power tied to vision has meant an assumption of leadership in Europe and in international diplomacy that have only strengthened the practices based on that vision and made them more effective. In short, vision is now backed by power.

As this vision of multilateralism, anti-militarism, and supranationalism is married to an increasingly wealthy and, by traditional measures, powerful, state, Germany has began to successfully exercise what Ian Manners called "normative power,"[10] or the effort to tame anarchy with civilian (as opposed to military) practices and attract others to join in the effort.[11] Germany has used normative power backed by its material resources to tackle many of the new international crises that have arisen since the Cold War's end and to foster and enhance international cooperation to resolve new global problems.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, fundamental change has taken place in the very nature of the international system itself, a change for which Germany's foreign policy vision is particularly appropriate. It is a change in which new threats throughout the world undermine sovereignty and cannot be vanquished through national "power," traditional practices of power politics, or even traditional international diplomacy. This does not mean that traditional power politics will not be exercised; far from it. But the exercise of that power will become increasingly ineffective in achieving policy aims. The point is that Germany's foreign policy vision seems ideally suited to steer effective policy in a world where rigid notions of power and sovereignty are failing as a guide to successful foreign policy and where traditional conceptions of the "national" interest are increasingly irrelevant. Germany may have become a "normal" power after unification, but that by and large, it exercises "normative power" on the world stage.

A Vision born in weakness but bolstered by strength

Ironically, Germany's foreign policy vision was born in weakness as a strategy for survival in its post-war world of defeat, division, and occupation. Firmly in the grip of occupying powers, the Federal Republic had few policy options in defeat after the carnage it had left behind in the first half of the 20th century. Until 1955, as William Paterson suggests, Germany could be called a "pre-sovereign" state.[12] It is well known that the core of Adenauer's legendary foreign policy was focused by necessity on the abandonment of unilateral sovereignty claims and the dissolving of German foreign policy into European institutions, identity, and multilateral regimes. Most striking was the stance on the role of military power. In the absence of national control over military force, German leaders began to hold the belief that military means to solve foreign policy problems should be a last resort. With no real foreign policy of its own, Germany's international behavior was based on civilian practices: trade, foreign aid, peacekeeping, international monitoring and international law. These practices led to a view of

"cooperative security" that linked classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural and human-rights concerns. "Cooperative security" was seen as "*indivisible,*" in the sense that Germany's own security was seen as inseparable from that of other states in an interdependent world. It was "*cooperative,*" in the belief that security is based on confidence building, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions. Adenhauer's vision was perhaps the only practical strategy that would allow Germany to hold on to the last shreds of "national interest" in the absence of traditional state power and national sovereignty.[13]

That strategy of maintaining the national interest by abandoning it and giving up the forces that propped it up, was accompanied and bolstered by a stunning transformation of both society and political culture within Germany. German society changed from one that was complicit with the barbarism and inhumanity of the concentration camps to a one that became deeply imbued with a commitment to liberal democracy, collective security, human rights, and anti-militarism—values that utterly reshaped German political identity.[14]

Even after 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany attained partial sovereignty, this culture was bolstered by a political structure which Peter Katzenstein described as "semi-sovereign," a structure in which the state was unable to act autonomously from the many social and institutional networks that attempt to influence political outcomes. Clogged with competing interests in a decentralized federal system, decision-making was slow and incremental, making any policy change—including change in foreign policy-- difficult. It would also be difficult for any one social or political group to capture the state to change the direction of German foreign policy. Unlike Britain or the United States, West German policy was unlikely to be subject to wide policy swings, even as sovereignty was restored.[15] This important aspect of semi-sovereignty supported the FRG's unique foreign policy vision and protected the West German state from counterproductive delusions of grandeur still held by other states.

The fact that West German leaders chose that particular strategy is unsurprising. The strength of a nation's commitment to international law and organizations, collective security, and international norms has usually been inversely proportional to its power. The weaker and more vulnerable a state, the more important are international institutions that protect its rights. Conversely as a country grows in power, the more foreign policy options it has, the less it must conform to the views of its partners in international organizations and the more it can afford to ignore them if it sees fit. Thus the view that Germany's foreign policy vision was only appropriate for a weak state and the speculation that Germany would revert to the practice of traditional power politics as it grew more powerful.

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Power and practice before 1990

1990 was clearly a watershed, but West German power had grown throughout the postwar period, and the policies based on the vision of "civilian power" and the submergence of national power in international institutions were increasingly backed by growth in the traditional measures of national power. No one will deny the significance of the post-war West German *Wirtschaftswunder* that permitted the FRG grew to become the third largest economy in the world and the largest economy in Europe.[16] And few observers will contest the fact that the economic gap between West Germany and its

neighbors began to grow before unification. Germany has long and successfully defended its title as one of the world's leading exporters.

By the 1980s, West Germany, together with France, exercised power in shaping the European integration process. The Single European Act of 1985—the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome-- largely reflected French and German preferences. The Deutschmark was the backbone of the successful European Monetary System, the precursor to European Monetary Union.[17] French officials declared that they considered the Federal Republic of Germany to be the West's industrial leader, and despite US military preeminence, the French government would therefore follow West German policies on export control. And West Germany was becoming Europe's "patron." In the 1980s it contributed the most to the EC budget of any member state, almost 1/3 more than France, the second largest contributor, and its receipts were lower than any other state.

But even in the absence of power conferred by sovereignty and unity, Bonn was assertive in pursuit of its policy vision, even when that assertiveness was often risky and against the grain of traditional power politics. During the Cold War, the FRG could have remained passive in the shadow of its occupiers, but instead often rose to the occasion in times of crisis by acting as an "honest broker" in conflicts and disputes among partners and between partners and adversaries.

Successive post-war West German governments played the honest broker in transatlantic quarrels, in Cold War disputes between the US and Russia, and in rancorous Middle East conflicts. They followed Bismarck, allying with old friends in the west and building bridges to new ones in the east, developing better relations with each of them than they had with each other.[18] But this time, the aim was not to simply keep conflicting parties apart as Bismark had done, but rather to bring them closer together in cooperative arrangements.

Ostpolitik was a bold policy initiative that would prove to be the most risky of West Germany's post-war honest broker policies: an assertive act not entirely consistent with its power position. Certainly, during the cold war years, commitment to Atlanticism always trumped any policy that would reach out to the East. But at the very height of the Cold War, West German leaders single-handedly laid down the foundations for rapprochement with the Eastern bloc. And when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the German government, while condemning the offensive, emphasized—to the displeasure of the United States-- that conflict management in the East-West relationship demanded continuing the dialogue across the Iron Curtain rather than reducing the ties that had been so carefully built throughout the decade.

Indeed, the FRG was often assertive before unification—and not always in the service of its policy vision. Even in a state of "semi-sovereignty" before 1990, the Federal Republic sometimes exhibited behavior that can be interpreted as narrowly self-interested. As part of the strategy to increase exports, for example, Germany—in its role as a "trading state"-- sold dual-use goods and technology abroad—even to unstable countries.[19] In 1989, a West German firm, Imhausen-Chemie, had provided Libya with the goods and technology to produce poison gas in significant and dangerous quantities. In the thick of the Cold War, the FRG broke with the United States when it chose to assist the Soviet Union in building a pipeline to transport natural gas to Europe.[20] And from the

1970s until the creation of EMU, West Germany riled its European partners by raising interest rates to counter domestic inflation.

But for the most part, Bonn adhered to the old vision. The fact that German leaders chose that particular strategy is unsurprising. The strength of a nation's commitment to its allies, international law and organizations, collective security, and international norms has usually been inversely proportional to its power. The weaker and more vulnerable a state, the more important are the allies for security and the international institutions for the protection of its rights. Conversely as a country grows in power, the more foreign policy options it has, the less reliant it is on those same allies and international organizations and the more it can afford to ignore them if it sees fit. These assumptions gave rise to the view that Germany's foreign policy vision was only appropriate for a weak state and to the speculation that Germany would revert to the practice of traditional power politics after it achieved full sovereignty.

Power and Practice since Unification

Clearly, the Soviet Union's collapse and America's declining European presence enhanced Germany's *relative* political weight in Europe and in the world. Germany's economy grew to become the largest in Europe, and the gap between German economic strength and that of its neighbors remains large. The EU is dependent on German goods, and Germany maintains a competitive advantage in the production of the most highly valued goods in Europe. In 2008, Germany retained its position as the world's number-one exporter, even against a far more rapidly growing China, despite having fewer than a tenth as many inhabitants. And since unification, Germany has grown in the traditional indicators of military power. Despite declining defense spending, Germany's army is the largest in Europe and it has the 6th largest defense budget in the world [21] It has stationed more troops abroad than any country except the US.

This strength has affected policy in two ways. First, Germany has been able to become a regional hegemon, providing stability to an increasingly integrated Europe. Although they would not use the term "hegemon," most observers would accept Bulmer, Jeffrey, and Paterson's claim that Germany exercises 'institutional power' [22] in the EU, and through that form of power, steers the course of European integration. In exercising leadership to deepen European integration, Germany has relinquished important aspects of national sovereignty and independence. My argument goes further. True to its foreign policy vision and backed by growing power, Germany has taken on *a disproportionate share of the regional burden of European integration.* A few examples suffice to illustrate: Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, consistently paying in almost twice as much as it has received; in contrast, France and the UK have managed to maintain relative parity between payments and receipts. In the realm of non-proliferation policy and export control, Germany continues to be the leader in cooperative efforts to stem the tide of weapons proliferation. Within the EU, Germany took the lead in creating a regime to curb the spread of technology that can be used to create WMD. And as noted above, German leadership ushered in European Monetary Union, an unprecedented step in European integration. The German economy now stabilizes the euro and is the driving force behind the euro's strength.[23] In short, Germany took the lead in creating European institutions, provided these institutions with stability, and paid a price to maintain cooperation. As Adam Posen writes, Germany has played the role of the 'nice guy who

picks up the check and turns a blind eye to others' free-riding on him…' [24] Ironically, itt is the very fact that Germany is seen as Europe's patron that permits acts that deviate from that role to be magnified out of proportion and interpreted as a return to self-interested behavior.

Of course Germany was not alone in these accomplishments, but European integration and multilateralism have long been pillars of German foreign policy, and as its economic power grew, Germany was able to take a leadership role in cementing that cooperation. As a counterfactual exercise, it would be difficult to imagine the creation and enlargement of the European Union, the deepening of European integration, and Europe's exercise of "normative power" on the international stage in the absence of German power and leadership. German practices in comparison with those of its strongest European partners seem to bear out Katzenstein's claim that Germany's identity has become 'European,' and that its European identity is more pronounced than that of its neighbors.[25]

Secondly, Germany has has exercised normative power to the international stage, and it has underwritten its policy aims with material support. It has taken responsibility for the largest proportion of the EU obligation to reduce greenhouse emissions under the Kyoto Treaty and is the third largest contributor to the UN budget (with a larger contribution than 4 of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council). In absolute terms, it is the third largest contributor to international development assistance.

There has been much debate about the role of the German military since unification and full sovereignty.[26] By most traditional measures, the German military has become powerful since unification. And since the beginning of this century, Germany has taken over the command of multilateral military operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, as well as the naval deployment to Lebanon. Nonetheless, in the years after unification, German defense spending fell by roughly 15 per cent, and Germany cut its armed forces from 670,000 troops to 340,000.[27] Twenty years after unification, the German military remains the least "deployable" of NATO's armies. Its structure is still not geared toward power projection but rather on territorial defense.[28] One third of all potential conscripts are conscientious objectors. Although the German military is involved in eight peacekeeping and crisis management operations around the world, and all of Germany's army units are assigned to multinational units, the rules of engagement for German troops limit their use of force far more than the rules for other NATO troops.[29]

And Germany has continued in its role of the "honest broker," a role that has become increasingly important as international crises have changed and multiplied in the past twenty years. Eerily, the Balkans proved again to be the testing ground. This time it was the wars of Yugoslav secession. The great powers picked sides in the Bosnian war: Russia (and France) supported Serbia, and the US supported Bosnia and Croatia. Despite its support for Croatia's independence, Germany quickly became the mediator between Russia and the West, knowing that the former Yugoslavia could not be stabilized without Russian participation. German negotiators crafted a compromise between opposing sides in the war in order to prevent an escalation of global tensions.[30]

In the Middle East, Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer became "bridge-builders" between the West and the Arab world. Declaring Germany's intention to forestall a "clash of civilizations" between the West and Islam while continuing to support Israel, Schroeder intensified relations with leading Muslim nations. In particular,

Germany played an important role in negotiations to end Iran's nuclear threat. The United States had excluded itself from negotiations early on; its position was that the West should isolate Iran and threaten war if Iran continued along the nuclear path. Germany took the lead in the successful effort to bring the US on board.[31] When the case was taken to the UN Security Council where Russia and China joined the negotiations, making Germany the only party to the negotiations who was not a permanent member.

One could argue that the roles of honest broker and member of a negotiating team are the only roles fitting for Germany's position on the international stage; by the lights of traditional power politics, Germany does not have the capability to threaten Iran. Germany is only one of the European negotiating team (EU 3). Nonetheless, as the strongest country in Europe, Germany is in a position to lead the team: Germany's language in all of the negotiating packages offered to Iran has prevailed. Furthermore, the other two members of the EU-3 have been weakened: Britain's role in the Iraq war has undermined its credibility in the Arab world, and France's ties to Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon raise suspicions in both Israel and the United States about its objectivity. Indeed, Germany is in a material position to influence Iran; not only is it Iran's largest trade partner, but 75% of Iran's small and medium industries rely on imported goods and technology from Germany. Germany is also Syria's most important trade partner. And while far from breaking ranks with the United States, Chancellor Merkel has made it clear that military action against Iran is "not an option."

Despite its sustained role in European integration, its constructive role in international diplomacy, and its shaping of the military for the primary purpose of peacekeeping, there are instances in which Germany has also deviated from its radical vision, just as it did many times *before* unification. For example, the recognition of Croatia in 1991 broke an agreement with European partners to act in concert with regard to the wars of the Yugoslav secession. The brief abrogation of the Eurozone's stability and growth pact violated the agreement on European Monetary Union. Perhaps most troubling—and most damaging to my argument-- the growth of German arms exports both before and after unification violates and trivializes the norms of anti-militarism and cooperative security.

Nonetheless in a larger sense, Germany *has* adhered to its foreign policy vision as its power grew. Why? A thorough answer would require another essay and a closer look at Germany's domestic political system. Germany's internal political "semi-sovereignty" may have been compromised in several ways after unification, but incrementalism has continued to characterize the making of *foreign policy*, and political structure still prevents rapid change. [32] Sometimes domestic forces and culture have shaped Germany's preferences in opposition to the policy vision and in ways that are narrowly self-interested. But what is crucial is that German leaders did not abandon their commitment to multilateralism and anti-militarism as their country began again to exhibit the traditional markers of state power. And they did not abandon that commitment when full sovereignty was restored to a united Germany. And German society did not revert to the nationalism and militarism that was its signature in the first half of the 20th century.

Power and Vision in the face of new challenges

The abrupt and astonishing fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 ironically heralded the beginning of a painful process of global transformation. International politics, long dominated by stable bipolar confrontation and governed by well-defined rules and hierarchies of power, unraveled over night. Until November 8, 1989, while the world continued to focus on the behavior of states and their rulers, social, technological, economic, and political forces were at work below the radar. When the Berlin Wall was cracked open, analysts were caught completely off guard; the focus on the East German "state" and Soviet domination, the belief that powerful international actors would keep Germany divided, and the conviction that power politics would always determine outcomes, acted as blinders. Old paradigms blinded statesmen and analysts alike to the reality of the East German state's "wizard of Oz" character, the importance of non-state actors and the power of non-violent citizen action. And primary focus on the state continued. Symbolically true to the old paradigm, October 3was chosen as the day to celebrate this transformation, in the continued belief that a unified and sovereign *state* was the most significant outcome of these revolutionary changes.

Joyful events in Germany were followed by sudden death of Yugoslavia and then the death of one of the world's two "superpowers"—other Wizard of Oz states unmasked. Breathtaking ethnic and sectarian violence erupted across the globe, leaving gross human rights violations and millions of refugees in its wake. Nimble and lethal non-state challengers emerged in force; exclusive and well-armed "isms" grew, and states continued to respond with more militarization, Nuclear weapons have proliferated both horizontally and vertically, and even if they were to be abolished, there are huge stockpiles of conventional arms around the world, some so devastating as to be comparable to them.

Predictable practices of power politics—still entrenched in the foreign policy bureaucracies of powerful and weaker states alike—continue but are maladapted to this new unpredictable environment. And analysts have failed to understand new challenges because they are locked in a brittle 19th century vision of the world that is long out of date. Both analysts and policy-makers are baffled by a world where overwhelming modern force cannot defeat tribal combatants living in caves, where computer hackers can potentially shut down a nation, where threats to the "national interest," can come from the earth's atmosphere, where a global financial crisis, like the fall of the Berlin wall, can happen over night—, and where, as Konrad Jarusch has written, "havoc created by global capitalism. . .is beginning to rival the suffering caused by the nation state."[32] Experts and politicians will continue to be blind to a host of other problems lurk that were once unthinkable, but now inevitable, unless the paradigm changes.

The German foreign policy vision was freed from the old paradigm when it was forced to abandon the practice of traditional power politics after May 8, 1945. Of course, in the face of many current problems, Germany's foreign policy vision is still limited. But among all the great powers in the 21st century, Germany is equipped with a transformative foreign policy *Weltanschauung* that can give birth to practices which can meet the challenges of a transformed world. These practices may represent the beginning of a new form of power that is not based on the use of raw material force to compel others into compliance. Rather, it is based on the ability to attract them as partners in solving big problems often obscured by outdated assumptions of what constitutes interest and power in the international system.

Conclusion

The debate over continuity and change in German foreign policy emerged because of Germany's rise in the traditional sources of power that caught the world's attention when Germany's unity and full sovereignty were restored. This particular debate emerged because the paradigm of power politics is still dominant in both analytic and policy circles. In the early years of the Federal Republic the foreign policy vision described here was the only choice in the face of defeat and widespread experience of the havoc that Germany had wrecked on the first half of the twentieth century. But as noted above, the more power a state amasses, the more options it has in its foreign policy choices. For powerful states the options chosen reveal the relationship between vision and practice. After 1990, Germany could have taken a more self-interested path—as Britain did—with regard to European integration. But German leaders chose to integrate more deeply into Europe *and to underwrite the integration process.* Of course Germany does not always agree with the *means* its partners have chosen to solve collective problems, and will attempt to steer collective decision-making in directions that its leaders prefer. But disagreement on means does not mean rejection of cooperative ends. Claims to the contrary neglect the larger picture. After 1989 Germany had the option to shed the role of the honest broker and assert unilateral self-interest as it had had done in the beginning of the 20th century. But German leaders from Kohl to Merkel have taken the path consistent with its vision of diplomacy, and provided leadership in international negotiations. Allies and critics have called on Germany to drop its restrictive rules of combat in Afghanistan, but Germany has refused to do so.

There is no question that Germany could revert to traditional practices of power politics in many issue areas. But the assumptions that guide those practices are likely to render them increasingly useless in the face of the revolutionary changes of the 21st century. So far, the vision of cooperation, integration, and anti-militarism has largely prevailed in practice, and Germany's normative power has continued to grow.
The 21st century international environment presents a clear challenge to the cooperative vision guiding German foreign policy, and it challenges Germany's power to back that vision. Germany's vision is still focused on international, not "global" issues. I have suggested, however, that on the positive side, Germany's normative power is still amplified by material power, and there are many 21st century problems that Germany *has* successfully confronted. Even then, however, thorny questions remain: Can the exercise of normative power alone reduce human rights abuses and manage ethnic and sectarian conflict? Can Germany maintain its status as a "civilian power" and its commitment to anti-militarism when it has grown to become the third largest arms exporter in the world? Can Germany's vision of cooperation lead to the construction of new international governance structures that include new actors and are fashioned to meet the challenges of a new century? Let us revisit these questions in another twenty years' time, on a future anniversary of change in Germany.

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[1] I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ronny Clausner in the preparation of this article.

[2] Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2005-06, 29:1 pp. 61–62. Similar arguments those made by ThomasU. Berger in , "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317–356; Peter J. Katzenstein, and his colleagues in *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); John S. Duffield in, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998); Thomas Banchoff in, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Adrian Hyde-Price in *Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 116–117; Volker Rittberger, ed. *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001); Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990–2003* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004)

[3] For overviews of this literature, see: Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann, "Taking Process Seriously. Concatenations of Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,* Mar 22, 2006; Rainer Baumann, "The German Way' -- Germany's policy in the Iraq Crisis and the Question of Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,* Mar 17, 2004; Thomas Risse, "Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine 'neue' deutsche Außenpolitik?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 11, no. 3. (2004): 24-31; Sebastian Harnisch, "Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy" *German Politics* vol.10 no.1 (2001): 25-60; Eva Gross, "German Foreign Policy and European Security and Defense Co-Operation - The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies?" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA*, Feb 28, 2007 available at <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180815_index.html>

[4] See Gunther Hellmann, "Fatal attraction? German foreign policy and IR/foreign policy theory" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12 (2009): 257–292.

[5] See, for example John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future', *International Security*, 15 (Summer 1990); Christopher Layne, `The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise', *International Security*, 17 (Spring 1993), especially pp. 41-45, Kenneth Waltz, `The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, 18 (Fall 1993), Philip H. Gordon, `The Normalization of German Foreign Policy', *Orbis* (Spring 1994. Max Otte with Juergen Grewe, *A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), Christian Hacke,

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"Mehr Bismarck, weniger Habermas. Ein neuer Realismus in der deutschen Außenpolitik?," *Internationale Politik*, (June 2006): 71. Some realists see a continuation of the old practices and believe that Germany should engage in power politics but is not doing so. They argue that Germany's continued emersion in Europe, the rules of engagement that limit Germany's participation in combat, and a "pacifist population" are restrict its capabilities and that Germany should marry its material power to decisive military leadership and to "match "rhetoric with risk." Germany is often seen as consistently punching below its actual political and diplomatic weight when it plays that role. Those who urge Germany take on a "leadership" role or pursue a truly independent foreign policy often interpret this policy as one that hides behind its "culture of reticence," or a policy that refuses to leave its "reflexive comfort zone," lacks the courage to "take sides in international disputes," and is afraid to leave its "safe house of moral comfort and limited involvement." For the most recent expressions of this view see John C. Hulsman and Nile Gardiner, "After Schroeder: U.S.-German Relations in the Merkel Era" Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1907 11 January 2006 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1907.cfm; John Vinocur, "Ms. Merkel Becomes Ms. Soft Power," *International Herald Tribune* , 17 (September 2007); Karl-Heinz Kamp and Julian Lindley-French "Big power, little will," *New York Times*, 14. June (2008); Stephen Walt, "Over-achievers and under-achievers," 21 April (2009) available at The New ForeignPolicy.com http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/21/over_achievers_and_under_achievers

[6] Pierre Gallios, "Vers une predominance allemande," *Le Monde*, 16 July (1993).

[7] For these accounts see Beverly Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2007): 14, 108, 132-133, 140.

[8] See note 1.

[9] See Charles Kindelberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley, 1973); Charles Kindelberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides," *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 25 (1981): 242–54, and Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Discord and Cooperation in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, 1984).

[10] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40 no. 2 (2002): 235-58.

[11] François Duchêne "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', in Max Kohnstamm and William Hager (eds) *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community* (London 1973): 1-21, Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, "'This is My EUtopia ...': narrative as power", in J. H. H.Weiler, Iain Begg and John Peterson (eds) *Integration in an Expanding European Union* (Oxford, 2003): 341–66. and for a popularization of this view Andrew Moravcsik, "The Quiet Superpower" *Newsweek*, 17 June 2002.

[12] See William E. Paterson, "European Policy-making: Between Associated Sovereignty and Semi-sovereignty," in *Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited* edited by Simon Green, William E. Paterson (Cambridge UK, 2005): 261-282.

[13] Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-199.* (Ann Arbor, 1999).

[14] See Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, 1997), Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Anti-Militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan ,* (Baltimore, 1998) , Konrad H. Jarausch. *After Hitler: Recivilizing the Germans, 1945-1995* (New York, 2006).

[15] *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State*. (Philadelphia, 1987).

[16] By 1990, Germany's share of all European imports and exports was 25.6 per cent, compared to France's 16 per cent, the next highest. Cited in Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, 'Should Europe Fear the Germans," in John Huelshoff, Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, eds., *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification* (Ann Arbor, 1993): 278.

[17] William Wallace, "Is Germany Europe's Leading Power?," *World Today,* vol. 51(1995): 162–5, 1993; Jeffrey Frieden, "The Dynamics of International Monetary Systems: International and Domestic Factors in the Rise, Reign, and Demise of the Classical Gold Standard," in Jack Snider and Robert Jervis, eds., *Coping with Complexity in the International System* (Boulder, 1993): 137–62. Markovits and Reich (see note 15), Michael E. Smith and Wayne Sandholtz, "Institutions and Leadership: Germany, Maastricht, and the ERM Crisis," in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds. *The State of the European Union: Building a European Polity?"* (Boulder, 1995): 245–65: Helen Milner, "Regional Economic Cooperation, Global Markets, and Domestic Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty," *Journal of European Public Policy, vol.* 2 (1995) : 337–60;

[18] In 1877, Bismarck's "iron rule" for German foreign policy was to create "political situation in which all the powers need us and are kept as much as possible from forming coalitions against us." He thus balanced commitments to Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia with the aim of preserving peace in Europe which would in turn permit Germany power to grow. When crises among opposing sides threatened to tear fragile alliances apart, Bismarck interceded as the honest broker to settle disputes. See A. J. P Taylor, *Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman,* (New York, 1969).

[19] Beverly Crawford, *Economic Vulnerability in International Relations* (New York,1993) ; Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat. "Chemical Weapons I,"

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI FACT SHEET 1984 ; Harald Müller, Matthias Dembinski, Alexander Kelle and Anette Schaper, *From Black Sheep to White Angel? The New German Export Control Policy*, Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt), Report No. 32 (1994); Michael Rietz, "Germany's Export Control Law in the New Millennium" (2002) available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/rietz2002.html; Amnesty International, "Who Armed Iraq?" *Terror Trade Times* (2003) available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ttt4-article_7-eng.

[20] In l982, the United States imposed an embargo on all U.S. technology bound for the USSR to be used in the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to the FRG. European firms had contracted to build this pipeline with U.S. technology and equipment in exchange for increased supplies of Soviet natural gas. With the embargo of equipment, the U.S. attempted to halt the construction of the pipeline, arguing that its supply of gas to Europe would create unacceptable NATO dependence on Soviet energy supplies. The embargo triggered bitterness and discord within the Western alliance because European allies refused to comply with U.S. embargo requirements and stubbornly refused to halt the pipeline construction.

[21] SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2008) accessed at http://www.defencetalk.com/sipri-yearbook-2008-armaments-disarmament-and-international-security-15581/

[22] See Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William Paterson, *Germany's European Policy: Shaping the Regional Milieu*. (Manchester, 2000). For a recent statement of Germany's EU leadership role see Gunther Hellmann, " Ein fordernder Multilateralismus. Deutschlands Fortschreibung seiner außenpolitischen Traditionslinie ist gefestigter als gemeinhin unterstellt," in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 4. February (2009).

[23] For a more detailed empirical account of Germany's leadership, contributions to stable cooperation, and adherence to the German policy vision under Merkel (albeit from a critical perspective), see Christian Hacke, "Germany's foreign policy under Angela Merkel" in *The AICGS Advisor*, (August 8, 2008) available at *http://www.aicgs.org*

[24] Adam S. Posen "If America Won't, Germany Must" *Internationale Politik* vol. 6 (2005): 32–37.

[25] Katzenstein (see note 13).

[26] This debate started almost immediately after unification and continues today. See, for example: Hanns W Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik," *Europa-Archiv* vol. 47, no. 10 (1992) 269-78; Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* (Berlin,1994), William Wallace, "Deutschland als europäische Führungsmacht," *Internationale Politik* vol. 50, no. 5 (1995): 23-8; Christian Hacke, *Die*

Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen? (Berlin, 1997); Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint', and the Quest for Normality", in: *German Politics* vol. 10 no. 1 (April 2001): 61-82; Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," in *European Security* vol. 13 no. 3 (2004): 215-245; Ole Wæver, " European Integration and Security: Analysing French and German Discourses on State, Nation, and Europe" in: David Howarth (ed.), *Discourse Theory in European Politics*. (Basingstoke/Hampshire, 2005): 33-67; "The Berlin Stonewall," *The Economist*, 30 October 2008; Hacke, 2008 (note 22).

[27] It is commonly agreed that NATO members should spend 2 percent of their national wealth on defense. This target is also a minimum requirement for the EU's European Security and Defense Policy to be credible. Germany has refused to spend more than 1.4 percent on defense.

[28] See Hacke, 2008, (note 22).

[29] In Afghanistan, for example, German Tornado aircraft are limited to unarmed reconnaissance; German Medevac helicopters have to be back at base by dusk; German rules of engagement prevent German soldiers from firing if the targets may be civilians. No other member of NATO, and no other member of the coalition in Afghanistan must adhere to these restrictions.

[30] Beverly Crawford "The Bosnian Road to Nato Expansion," in *Journal of Contemporary Security Policy* vol. 21 no. 2, (August 2000).

[31] Press reports cited Germany as being the "most aggressive of the European three" in the effort to bring the US into the negotiations. See Garath Porter, "Iranian Crisis in the Wilderness," Asia Times Online (May 2006), available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_east/HE02Ak04.html

[32] See the essays in *Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited* edited by Simon Green, William E. Paterson, (Cambridge, UK, 2005).